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Thc study of metaphor has long been hampercd by the posrAristotclian bias that
mctaphor is merc poetic figurativc language. Such bias has been compoundcd by
sequential models ofcognitive processes cemented into scientific (and subsequcntly
psychological) literature. During the last dccade, however, cognitivc scicntists
have begun to re-cvaluate thc importancc of metaphor as a key element in abstract
thinking, realizing particularly thc universality of the metaphoric dynamic. This
focus has been further underscored by findings in cognitive neurosciencc that
show both that languagc proccssing involves visual, motor, auditory, and other
neural systems, and that multimodal cxperiences related to metaphor may con-
verge in central processing areas. Further, they have noted that, rather than being
geographically localized, language processing is distributed throughout the brain.
To explain this distribution, one anthropological model proposes that growing
societal complexity neccssitated increased linguistic development for which the
brain adapted existing brain areas. Such investigative insights support thc
assumption that mctaphor 
-far from being a mere literary embellishment- is in
reality a key elcment in thc cognitive inferences by which all language users
interpret and copc with their expcriential world.
Not only arc emcrging neuroscientific insights into the working ol thc brain
challenging traditional vicws of languagc and its elements, but thc inter-disciplinarity
of neurosciencc itsell is raising practical questions about what does and what does
not lie in the realm of literal languagc. Most particularly, the need for scientists
from many fields to form discoursc communities has led to an increased need for
the use of explanatory metaphor within neuroscientific discoursc, even though
historically a bias has existed among classical scholars that metaphor belongs in the
realm of "novel poetic languagc" (Lakoff 1993: 202). Yet, in reality, metaphors
have long been uscd in scientific thought to cxpress the novel, ranging from "thc
clockwork metaphor for the solar system, and Harvey's pump metaphor for thc
heart" to Crick's "searchlight of attention" hypothesis for cellular level
thalamocortical interaction (Baars 1997: n.p.). Within contcmporary neurosciencc,
Baars (1997) has suggested a thcatcr mctaphor for conscious attention in which
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convergence zones are likened to thc "theater stage," selective attention to the
"searchlight," receiving areas to the "audiencc," unconscious systems to "backstage,"
and executive systems to the "director" (n.p.). Similarly, Killeen (personal
communication, March 25, 1996) explains adaptive resonance theory as thc
sympathetic vibrations set up on a neurological aeolian harp over which the wind of
incoming information plays, while Grossberg (1987) accounts for ritualistic serial
order learning by proposing a "processing avalanche" that allows a simple network
to learn a complex series when a "sampling signal lransvcrses a long axon that
activates regularly spaccd cclls" (p. 329). Obviously, such applications of mctaphor
broaden its applications well bcyond that of a simplc poetic trope, indeed, thc very
function of metaphor in thcsc examples has shifted from poetic embellishmcnt of
thc familiar using the novel to pragmatic cxplanation of the novel using the familiar.
How, then, did such divergcnt vicws of metaphor arise, and how are pcrceptions of
metaphor changing?
Mgrepuon AS LITERARY TRoPE
As a literary trope or figure, metaphor belongs to the rhetorical category the Greeks
named schema, meaning at its most basic "a pairing of two patterns at unequal
levels" (Turner 1997: n.p.). Whereas for Plato, schemas were representations of the
metaphysical idea, Aristotle "reversed the directions of abstraction, preferring to
see abstract mental forms as epistemological schemara of concretc realities they
represent" (Turner 1997: n.p.). Thus, contrary to later interpretations, Aristotlc did
recognize that the linguistic forms of schema were driven by underlying conceptual
relationships. However, once rhetoricians turned to "applied tasks... Isuch as] the
production of instructional matcrials" a linguistic bias regarding not only metaphor
but all figures developed that incrcasingly ignored thc conceptual function of fig-
ures in favor of their use as verbal embellishments (Turner 1997: n.p.). Of cqual
wcight in thc relegation of metaphor to the realm of thc figurative were Aristotlc's
insistence that metaphor be banncd from argumentation (Gentner and Jerziorski
1993:448), and his warning that danger lay in thc "ambiguity and obscurity inherent
in" metaphor when confused with definition (Ortony 1993: 3).
Nevertheless, the conceptual matrix of tropes was recognizedby some lcading
thinkers in modern literary and rhetorical criticism, including Richards (1936), who
recognized the metaphoric nature of thought itself (p. 94); Lewis (1936), who viewed
parable as "a basic cognitive instrument" (p.44); and Burke (1945), who believed
the master tropes of irony, synecdoche, metonymy, and metaphor were crucial to
discovery of truth. Inherent in Burke's view of metaphor and its relation to both
real world and literary perspcctives was the notion of incongruity rccognition and
resolution and, even more important for contemporary metaphorical thcory,
admission of shifts in perception across sensory domains. Burke (1945), togcthcr
with Peppcr (1942), was also among thc earliest of scvcral modcrn scholars to
rccognize thc ubiquitousness of thc masLcr Lropes 
-and particularly, mctaphor-
throughout noL only thc art s but also thc social and hard scienccs (c.f. Brown 1977,
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Derrida 1978, White 1973, 1978). He anticipated the role of metaphor in social
policy and discourse as applied by Schón (1979), and its application in scientific
discourse as outlined by Boyd (1979) and Kuhn (1979). Yet, inegardless of insight
from such philosophers, until two decades ago, understanding of the nature of
metaphor was still skewed by the post-Aristotelian belief that it be used primarily
not for ideational functions but for linguistic expressions "assumed to be mutually
exclusive with the realm of ordinary everyday language" (Lakoff 1993:202).
Such a specialized role for metaphor in communication was also perpetuated by
rhetorical study that focused primarily on the comparativeness implicit in the nature
of mctaphor, reinterpreted later as the comparison theory, which "takes every
metaphor to be a condensed or elliptic simile" (Black 1962: 35-36). Such an
interpretation constituted a special case of the substitution view that. metaphor is the
replacement of "the entire sentencc" that houses the metaphor with "some set of
literal sentences" (Black 1962: 3l). One scholar who did move bcyond the
substitution view was Richards (1936), whose highly influential theory for analyzing
thc tension between metaphorical topic and vehicle far better addressed the
incongruities, or "conceptual incompatibilities" that appear to characterizc many
metaphors (Ortony 1993: 3). Not only did Richards provide "a set of useful terms
for talking about metaphors," he also provided the grounding for the verbal opposition
theory of Beardsley (1962) and the interaction theory of Black (1962), both of
which focused on the relationship between two different "semantic contents" (Searle
1979: 99). Black's (1962) theory implied that through changes in word meaning
metaphors serve to creaie new similarities, a concept later amendcd into thc "strong
creativity thesis" of metaphor that depends on some metaphors being 'cognitive
instruments,' indispensable for percciving connections that, once perceived, are then
truly present... " (Black 1979:39). While still unresolved, this creativity thesis did
move metaphoric function fulher toward the realm of the conceptual, and was ex-
tended by Boyd (1979) to suggest that in scientific discourse some "exegetical or
pedagogical metaphors" actually assist in the explication of theories whose
formulations are either less- or totally non-metaphorical (p. 359).
Subsequently, however, the inadequacy of both the comparison or similarity
theories and the semantic interaction theories, such as Black's (1962) and Beardsley's
(1962), was proposed by Searle (1919) as grounds for his own interpretation of
metaphor. He believed that the "endemic vice" of both approaches was their neglect
of the difference between "sentence or word meaning, which is never metaphorical,
and speaker or utterance meaning, which can bc metaphorical" (Searle 1993: 100).
Despite thc far-reaching influcncc of Searle's theory and its continued usc in the
metaphor theory litcrature, it is, as Rohrer (1995) explained, essentially a sequential
model that requires first that a metaphorical utterance "be processed as if it were
litcral," thcn that it be'Judged non-literal" so mandating the employment upon it of
"alternate strategies... to decode Iitl into literal" (n.p.). For Searlc, then, love is a
joumey needs first be cxpressed as thc analogy "love is like a journcy"-to which the
reader/listener's pragmatic knowlcdgc of journcys and love must be applicd.
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This focus on the literal versus the non-literal raised yet another debate crucial to
the nature of metaphor: whether or not a dichotomy even exisl.s between the literal
and the figurative. Turner (1991), based on a body of his earlier work, suggests that
"'literal' and 'figurative' are labels that serve as efficient shon-hand announcements
of our integrated reactions to the products of thought and language; they do not
refer to fundamentally different cognitive operations" (n.p.). He feels that thc
dichotomy is no morc than "a psychological illusion," arising from a folk theory in
which expressions appear litcral if thcy match real-world truth conditions but
figurative if they do not. Whilc hc admits that thc true/false conditions are valid, hc
argues that they do not signal differenccs in cognitive processes but rathcr differenccs
in reaction to the pairing of elements alrcady existing in conceptual category
structures. According to such an assumption, thc cxpression "a child is a miniature
adult," in which both elemcnts belong to the basic-lcvcl category'human being',
must seem more litcral than "a child is a sapling," in which the elements belong to
different basic-level categorics. A related "influence on judging a connection to bc
literal or figurativc [is] the dcgree to which thc conceptual connection or the linguistic
expression is generatively entrenched," thus individual reactions and judgments of
literality for "lifc is metabolism," "life is a play," "life is a lottery," and "life is an
isosceles trianglc" can be expectcd to diffcr between individuals, depending on how
easy the conceptual connections arc for thcm to make. As Turner (1997) points out,
expressions like "ethnic cleansing" seem highly figurative when first coined but
acquire greater literality with increased use. In sum, then, "conceptions and forms
that feel figurativc evolve" as does all thought and language, and the dcgree of
perceived figurativeness will vary at any onc time for each person during the evolution
depending on whcre the elements are located "on the interacting gradients of
distinction" (n.p.). Thus, litcrality and figurativeness do not represent discretc mental
processes despitc the perceived dichotomy perpetuated in much rhctorical study.
ScreNce AND METAPHoR
Within the sciences, the bias against using metaphorical comparisons for explanation
resulted primarily from a movc toward linear thought. As outlined by Gentner and
Jerziorski (1993), early Westem science, characterized by the alchemists whose
analogous correspondenccs were "remarkably rich and diverse" (p. a70), delighted
in the mixing of incongruous elements and was dominated by shifts from domain to
domain. For example, "a central comparison was a macrocosm-microcosm analogy
(or metaphor) by which man (the microcosm) was likencd to thc natural world" (p.
464). Subsequently, however, sciences movcd away from "the plurality of possible
match types" in favor of an extremcly selective process in which "thc strength of an
analogy in licensing scicntific prediction rcsts on thc degrec o[ systematic structural
match between thc two domains" (Gentncr and Jerziorski 1993:453). Such a shift
thus movcd scicntific invcstigation irredeemably away from parallcl potentials to
thc linear idcal codificd by Descartes; onc of scqucntialization based on thc
Aristotclian notion o[ stars as "units with a scrial ordcr" (citcd in Bailcy 1996: 66)
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and compression 
-"two potentially distorting Cartesian steps in aligning thought
with the strengths and weaknesses of the human mind" (p. 67). As Bailey points
out, such linear thinking became thoroughly entrenched in science despite Kant's
early proposition of the "obvious" involvement of human thinking in delineating
such sequences (p. 67):
It is we who bring order and regularity to phenomena and call the result "nature." These
properties would not be discovered in nature if our own minds had not first put them there:
for unity in nature means a prior. necessary. and certain connection of phenomena. (Kant
1960:53)
Ironically, an epiphenomenon of such linear thinking was that Descartes
effcctively hampered developments in the field of neurobiology for centuries by
proposing that "physical processes were measurablc and thus amenable to scientific
laws, but subjective processes were immaterial and not measurable" (Posner and
Raichle 1994:3).
A focus on metaphor-free literality derives, according to Ortony (1993), from
the scientific dictum that both scientific practice and language be characterized by
"precision and absence of ambiguity," culminating over half a century ago in the
doctrine of logical positivism (p. 1). Obviously, such a dictum mirrors the concem
of Aristotle that metaphor's inherent potential for ambiguity renders it inferior to
plain dcfinition, so underscoring the division between the literal and non-literal.
Relativism, in contrast, adopted the constructivist view that "ariscs through thc
interaction of that information with the context in which it is presented and with thc
knower's preexisting knowledge" (p. 1), a viewpoint that also sees no dichotomy
between the literal and figurative. While these two viewpoints represent extremes
subscribed to in various measure by myriad schools of thought in a wide spectrum
of disciplines, they illustrate "a more fundamental and pervasive difference of
opinion" about how language relates to the real world, leading to two differing
interpretations of metaphor 
-"metaphor as an essential characteristic of the creativity
of languagc, and metaphor as deviant and parasitic upon norrnal usage" (p.2). Thus,
as a consequence of philosophical and scientific reductionism, together with the
perceived irrelevancy of metaphorical language for accurate communication of real
world knowledge, metaphor became regarded over time as either a mere curiosity
or a complete irrelevancy in all disciplines but that of rhetoric (Ortony 1993: 2).
FnoM nHeToRICAL TRopE To coGNITIVE STRATEGy
Nevefheless, despite widespread acceptance of metaphor's limited communicative
role, some scholars did attempt to link it to human conceptual reality, leading
cvcntually to theories of metaphor that raised it much above a mere linguistic
embellishment. Schón (1979), in a social analysis that rejected thc view of metaphor
as an anomaly to bc cxplained (or explained away), concentrated on what he termed
a "gcnerativc mctaphor," a particular "perspective or frame... by which new
pcrspcctives on thc world come into existencc" (1979:254), applying the notion to
thc domain of social policy with its rcsulting phenomena of "framc awarcness, framc
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conflict, and frame restructuring" (p. 268). As a result, he concluded that the crucial
dynamic in frame conflict is "problem setting" rather than "problem solving," an
application laudcd by Reddy (1979) as potentially leading to "genuine advance in
the social and behavioral sciences" worthy of extension to "human communication
itself' (1979:285). Within this extension, Reddy framed his notion of the "conduit
metaphor," one that transfers "thoughts bodily from one person to another," conveyed
in writing and speaking by the insertion of thoughts or emotions into words to bc
extracted by others during listening and reading (1979:290). According to Lakoff
(1993), this famous essay led to his assumption that "metaphor is primarily conccp-
tual, conventional, and part of thc ordinary system of thought and languagc" (p.
203), thus providing the catalyst for the conccptual mapping modcl hc originally
proposed with Johnson (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).
Lakoff ( 1993) first cxplained the dynamic of conventional metaphor usc in terms
of mappings; "open-cndcd classIesl of potential correspondences across inference
patterns" that, once activated, "may apply to a novcl source domain knowledgc
structure and charactcrizc a corresponding targct domain knowledge structurc" (p.
210). More important, mappings should bc thought of neither as processes nor as
algorithms, but rather each should be considered a "fixed pattern of ontological
correspondences across domains that may, or may not, be applied to a source domain
knowledge structure or a sourcc domain lexical item" (p. 210) and which might
represent either concepts or images. Based particularly on the love is a journe¡'
metaphor and Rcddy's (1979) conduit metaphor, Lakoff (1993) concluded that
metaphor must necessarily bc not a figure of speech but rather a mode of thought
because it is characterized by "systcmaticity" oflinguistic correspondence, it governs
reasoning and resultant behavior, and its "novel extensions" are comprehensible in
terms of its "conventional correspondences" (p. 21 0). He also recognized potential
hierarchies for metaphor and in his earlier work outlined three mechanisms of novel
metaphor: "extensions of convcntional metaphors, generic-level metaphors, and
image metaphors," all ol which arc typically superimposed upon each other in poetic
metaphorical forms (p.237). Contrary to Searle, Lakoff bclieved that, because of
the fixed nature of thc mappings, their activation is not a product of conversion
from the literal, thus making possible simultaneous mappings of partial elements
for more than one mapping even though no complete mapping could apply to two
totally different domains at once (p. 219). Thus, for Lakoff, processing of love is a
journey is achieved through thc cognitive linking of image-schema encoded for
each of the two metaphorical elements.
CocNrrrve DEBATEs oN METApHoR
Despite its important role in broadcning undcrstanding of metaphor as a conceptual
rathcr than purely linguistic cmbcllishment, cognitive inquiry has itself been
hampcrcd by failurc to rccognizc mctaphor's ccntrality to cognitivc processing and
power for conccpl.ual communication. As outlined by Rohrer ( 1995), thc dcvclopmcnt
of thcorcl.ical issucs involving mctaphor within cognitivc scicncc has also bcen
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influenced by linguistic bias. He suggests that, "with a few notable exceptions,"
schol ars have traditi onal ly mo stly ignored fi g urat iv e language, releg atin g metaphor
to a "secondary linguistic process" (n.p.). This bias Rohrer blamed primarily on the
theoretical duality between the insfqntiation and embodiment hypotheses. These
two hypotheses represent at their most basic two divergent (though not inherently
mutually exclusive) approaches to investigation of the dynamics of human cognitive
processing that necessarily underlies metaphorical comprehension. The first
approach, emerging out of earlier classical sequential modcls in the field of Artifi-
cial Intelligence (AI), is computational, expressed most recently by neuronally
inspired parallel processing models (neural networks) more compatible with the
embodiment viewpoint. The second approach 
-necessarily subscribing to the
embodiment hypothesis- is neuroscientific, a product of actual interdisciplinary
cooperation in the sciences of the type advocated by Rohrer (1995) for all
invcstigation into metaphor theory.
Thc instantiation hypothesis bases its image of mind on "a serial processor driven
digital computer" (Rohrer 1995: n.p.) arguing "that reason, intelligence and minds
were substrate neutral, that is, independent of any specific embodiment, so long as
the body was a [sic] algorithmic device" (n.p.). This view assumes 
-following Alan
Turing's proof "that all digital computers were in principle reducible to recursive
elaboration of a finite state algorithm"- that all mental processes are similarly reduc-
ible and therefore subscribe to "a peculiar literal quality in that their variables are
either true or false with no admixture of truth or falsity permitted" (n.p.). Put simply,
Turing observed that computational processes, even when hierarchical, consist of a
limited number of binary logical steps that are used repeatedly; consequently,
language scholars assumed that language was made up of similar finite steps
performed on each of thc linguistic levels. According to such a view, symbolic
represenl.ations of the outside world should be matched literally within the brain by
a series of finite states (Rohrer 1995: n.p.). Therefore, comprchension of figurative
language, by default, was presumed to be "a mere afterthought to solving the problem
of literal language comprehension," whose complexities would automatically fall
into place once the overall problem of language reprcsentation was solved (n.p.).
The original Searlian approach as described above subscribes to such a processing
type.
Antithetical to the instantiation hypothesis, the embodiment hypothesis posits
that "minds are fundamentally not disembodied algorithmic processes like a computer
program, but are instead constituted and constrained by the kinds of organization
reflected in the biological, anatomical, biochemical, and neurophysiological
characteristics of thc body and the brain" (Rohrer 1995: n.p.). While both the
embodiment and instantiation hypotheses view cognitive processes as hierarchical
-that is, a system in which "higher-level processes... are built up of lower-level
processes" (n.p.)- thc embodimcnt hypothesis refutes thc imagc of mind as a
collcction o[ substrate ncutral processes of finite-state symbol manipulation in fa-
vor of interactive and intcrfaccd investigatory lcvels 
-'6many of which appear to
bchavc analogically and frcqucntly cxhibit a kind of adaptivc plasticity nol found in
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digital computers" (n.p.). The embodiment hypothesis motivates much of the recent
literature in cognitive science, including the most recent work by Lakoff and Johnson
(1999) on the implications of the embodied mind for Western philosophy.
ENlsoorráENt THEoRIES oF METApHoR
Subsequent to developing his cognitivc mapping model, Lakoff proposed that any
valid cognitive theory of metaphor would necessarily be antithetical to the traditional
literal-figurative dichotomy, lic beyond the pragmatic domain of Scarlian thought,
bc inconsistcnt with the assumptions of both Chomskyan generativc linguistics and
generativc semantics, be at odds with continental philosophy and deconstructionism,
and bc incompatible with many of the "traditions in symbolic artificial intclligcncc
and information proccssing psychology" that conceivc of thought proccsses as
"algorithmic symbol manipulation" (1993: 249). Consequently, he, like many
scholars working in cognitivc linguistics, turncd to the three-level Neural Theory of
Language (NTL) paradigm in which a neurocomputational level provides a theoretical
link between functional cognitive mcchanisms and structures 
-for example,
phonological, syntactic and semantic elements- and the underlying neurobiological
architecture that makes all cognitive functions possible (Lakoff and Johnson 1999:
I l0). This model grew out of the contemporary computational architectures based
on neural network or so-called connectionist models.
Contemporary computational architectures assume that brain architectures are
hierarchies that consist of "layers of receptive neuronal fields that react to different
types and levels of incoming stimuli" (Ney and Angelica 1998: 53). Stimulus
decoding involves competitive excital.ion and inhibition as new input is compared
and contrasted with pattems --or prototypcs- already encoded during prior experiencc.
Cognitive processing is thus interprcted as an "associational dynamic process
governed primarily by the firing of ncural synapses; the strength of connections
formed as a result of this firing; and thc patterns of excitation set up and reinforced
as patterns are repeated, similarities rccognized, and new information interprcted or
amended according to existing expectations" (p.53).The revolutionary aspect of
such architectures 
-besides their massively parallel rather than sequential, and
distributed as well as local processing potential- is that they vicw human cognition
as a function of pattern not one-to-one symbol processing (for further discussion,
see Angelica and Ney 1995). Further, those thcories most cited in the new field of
consciousness studies 
-for example, the adaptivc resonance thcory of Grossberg(1987)- suggcst that human cognitivc processing inherently involves continual
amendment of, and thereforc changc in, cxperiential encoding in response to
environmental demands. Such models, highly dynamic and nonlinear, arc antithetical
to linear scqucntial processing models such as that of Scarle.
In their latest work on mctaphor, Lakoff and Johnson ( 1999) proposc that humans
as "neural bcings" must ncccssarily usc catcgorization as a means of understanding
and communicating about thcir world. Consequcntly, categorization, rathcr than
bcing a totally intcllcctual proccss lhat rcsults from cxpcricncc, is thc vcry "stufl'
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of which experience is made. Further, "concepts" are in reality neural structures
that make possible mental characfeization of and reasoning about categories using
inferences based on categorical prototypes (p. 19), frequently through the medium
of metaphor. Thus, conceptualization of categories, often requiring the imposition
of "complex hierarchical systems," is inextricably tied to the sensorimotor system
of the human brain (p. 20), and no dichotomy exists between perception and
conception of experience (p. 39). Based on these assumptions, Lakoff and Johnson
examine two integral aspects of metaphor: its underlying mechanism, and the reason
for its universality.
To produce a theory of primary metaphors 
-the "atomic" metaphorical pans
that make up the more complex "molecular" metaphor- Lakoff and Johnson (1999)
integrate elements of Johnson's theory of conflation, Grady's theory of primary
metaphor, Narayanan's neural theory of metaphor and Fauconnier and Turner's
theory of conceptual blending. Conflation refers to the initial lack of differentiation
in young children between nonsensorimotor (subjective) and sensorimotor
experience, so producing cross-associations between the two domains that remain
even after the more mature youngster has learnt to differentiate between them.
According to Grady's 1997 unpublished dissertation (cited in Lakoff and Johnson
1999), cross-domain associations are laid down during the conflation of primary
metaphors that "[arise] naturally, automatically, and unconsciously" as a result of
everyday experiences to be later combined into more complex metaphors through
conceptual blending (p. 46). The neural theory suggests that associations between
mappings "are realized neurally in simultaneous activations that result in permanent
neural connections being made across the neural networks that define conceptual
domains... [so forming an] anatomical basis of source-to-target.... metaphorical
entailments" (pp.46-47). Admittedly, the notion of "permanent neural connections"
is more problematical in actual neuroanatomy than in a computational facsimile,
but if interpreted as a "process [in which] long-term connections are leamed that
coactivate a number of primary metaphorical mappings" (p. 49), then the model is
compatible with neurocognitive architectures. The extensions of such coactivations
through inference can then produce more complex anüor novel conceptual blends.
Consequently, universally embodied human experience leads to "at least several
hundred" universally acquired conceptual metaphors 
-learned not innate; manifested
not only linguistically but in "gesture, art, or ritual"; and produced by "immediate
conceptual mapping" rather than a "conscious multistage process of interpretation"
(pp. 56-57).
UrvrvBnsnr-rrY oF METAPHoR
Emerging realization of the universality of metaphorical thought supports the
assumptions that the matrix of metaphor is human sensorimotor physiology and that
metaphor plays a key role in the way that humans interact physically and conceptually
with their environment. As would be expected of a manifestation of sensorimotor
experience, many commonly used metaphors are tied to basic experiential elements
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such as spatial dimensions and relationships, physical motion, sensory experiencc,
and environmental forces or resources. Thus in English, for example, those who
"feel on top of the world" may "live close to the edge" causing relatives to "be
beside themselves." People may find themselves "progressing by leaps and bounds,"
"sitting on the fence," or "walking on eggshells." They may "grasp a concept,"
"think a movie stinks," "drink in an experience," "smell a Íat," or wield "an iron
hand in a velvet. glove." At the mercy of the "winds of change," individuals may
feel "trapped between a rock and a hard placc," "throw caution to the wind" or have
their "hcad in the clouds." In a "corporate jungle" where "time is money," those
"hungry for success" may have "fire in their bellies," as they "climb the pinnaclc of
success." Moreover, as pointed out by Lakoff and Johnson (see above), similar
expressions occur in languages from vastly different linguistic families.
Say (1998), in the belief that "metaphors build the basic conceptual structures of
human beings," has compiled a multilanguage database that examines source to
target mapping by analyzing how a base sensc 
-"how light this luggage is"- is
extended metonymically and quantitatiyely within domain 
-"the traffic ís light today"
[few vehicles]- then metaphorically and qualitatively across domain -"she is feeling
light in the head" tgiddyl, to produce metaphorical compounds such as "light-
fingered" fliable to steal], "light-hearted" [carcfree or easygoing), "light-footed"
[nimble], or "light-headed" [frivolous]. Drawing primarily on Chinese, English,
French, Malay, and Spanish, she particularly presents expressions related to universals
such as body parts, sleep, work, feelings, or sickness, in which the words for "heavy"
or "light" are used in a similar qualitative manner to convey degrees of seriousness,
value, or importance. Examples of universal similarities extrapolated from the
database include üose of attitude 
-Chinese, "yun dan feng qing" [to take something
lightly"l, French, "prendre quelque chose a la légére," Malay, "dipandang ringan,"
and Spanish, "tomarse el asunto ala ligera"; and character 
-the French light girl,
"une fille légére" is a lady of easy virtue (her male counterpaf, of course, is merely
"fickle") in perfect contrast to the Chinese heavy "de gao wang zhong," a person of
virtue and morals. Similarity also exists particularly in expressions related to body
part 
-"with a heavy heart," French, "avec le coetr lourd," Malay, "berat hati,"
Spanish "col pesar",' or sickness 
-Chinese, "ta shi zai bing de hen zhong" [his
sickness is heavy), Malay, "dia sakit berat" [he sick heavy), French, "il a le fiévre
légére" [he has a {s}light fever], Spanish, "él tiene un ligero catarro" [he has a
{s}light coldl.
This is not to say that variations do not exist 
-whereas a"dizzy" English speaker
says "I feel light-headed," a Chinese native, like a French speaker, says "my head is
heavy" ['tong hen zhong" and'J'ai latéte lourde" respectively]. In greater contrast,
a Malay speaker with a "ringan kepala" Ílight headl is one with a facility for
understanding, while the one with a "berat otak" [heavy brain] is sad. Where the
English speaker "looks down on" a person, the Chinese speaker "looks lightly on"
[qing shi: qing hul. In Chinese "ren wei yan quing $ight] is a "man and talk of no
importance" as opposed to one who plays "zhong ze da ren" [an important
{heavylrolel, a value that contrasts with thc American English "heavy" [the bad
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guy] in a movie, or the Spanish"pesado" who may be dull, boring, or annoying.
Based on such variations, Say (1998) suggested that it is within the metaphoric
extensions that cultural differences manifest themselves; nevertheless, whatever the
linguistic variation, conceptually the expressions are mutually comprehensible and
the social implications often inferential. For example, whereas English "light-
fingered," besides meaning "nimble," refers to an adroitness at stealing and
particularly picking pockets, French "avoir la main légére" often refers to cunning
political practices, an extension with obvious social ramifications. Similarly, in Malay
"ringan tangan" signals not only "nimble" but also "helpful," not only "one who
steals" but also "a busybody." Most important, Say's ongoing analysis suggests for
each language studied a similar dynamic from basic form to metaphoric extension(s),
despite major syntactic differences between the language groups.
This similarity of processing dynamic mirrors the increasing complexity proposed
by Lakoff and Johnson (see above). Moreover, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) have
pointed out that even when major cultural differences are assumed, the assumption
is often erroneous. Most parl.icularly, Westem philosophy is often differentiated
from other worldviews according to its perception of time. Influenced by such
perception, Whorf proposed that Hopi was a language lacking in any concept of
time or metaphor (cited in Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 150). In reality, however, in a
massive study, Malotki provided a wealth of Hopi time expressions, including myriad
time/space metaphors, such as "tomolangwuy aqw itam hoyoyota" [we're moving
toward winterl (cited in Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 151). Similarly, the metaphor of
"essential" or "real" self is pervasive in Western philosophy and Lakoff and Johnson
admit to having assumed it "a peculiarity of either English or the Western mind" (p.
284). However, in personal communication with linguistics professor Yukio Hirose
they learnt that. Japanese has a "metaphorical conception of inner life" very similar
to the American, including "karewa kiga titteiru" [he spirits dispersed] -he is
distracted; "karewa ikarino amari wareo wasureta" [he for too much anger self lost]-
he was beside himself with anger; "karewa yooyaku wareni kaetta" [he finally to
self renrmed] 
-he finally came to his senses; and "karewa hitomaedewa itumo kameno
kabutteiru" [he in public always mask puts on]- he always wears a mask in public.
Based on their broad analysis of the metaphor of self, Lakoff and Johnson ( 1999)
raised the important questions of whether "the metaphor [ñts] a preexisting qualitative
experience, or [whether] the qualitative experience [comes] from conceptualizing...
via that metaphor" (p. 289). They suggested that activation of the source domain
may in tum activate associated affect, even though they currently propose no dynamic
by which this coactivation may occur. The developing field of cognitive neuroscience,
however, is beginning to outline brain architectures in which such interdomain
association is a property of convergence between distinct and distributed neural
systems, each subserving specialized modal functions.
NeunococNlrlvE MATRICES FoR METApHoRTCAL THoucHT
Early ncuroanalytical studies focusing specifically on language produced the insights
of Broca and Wernickc that language functions are localized in spcciñc arcas of the
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brain, which understanding led neurologists, such as Lichtheim, to diagram for the
first time oral, visual, and motor linguistic processing and data flow within the brain
from the "visual and auditory reception areas" at the back of the brain to motor
areas in front (Posner and Raichle 1994: 107). Ncvertheless, such models lacked
plasticity being "largely serial and reflexive" (p.112), a view that incorporates the
misconception that phonological recoding is necessary for visual language to access
semantic codes (p.110). This sequential bias is rapidly weakening in the face of
electronically produced evidence (p.112). For example, in one early hierarchical
PET study on lexical access (Petersen, Fox, Posner, Minton, and Raichlc 1989), the
addition of a speech production task to passive reception of visual or auditory cues
produced expected activation in the primary motor cortex in both hemispheres; the
supplementary motorcortex, thought to be "involved in the programming of complex
motor activity" (Posner and Raichle 1994:118); the mid-cerebellum, "known to
guide motor activity" in a radar-like fashion (p. 1 18); and in the insular cortex,
recognized to support automatic processes such as word repetition or reading aloud
(p. 125). Conspicuously absent, however, was activation in either Broca's or
Wernicke's areas, even though activation of Wernicke's area would be predictable
from any processing model holding that visually presented words are necessarily
recoded through their phonological representations before being reproduced aloud
(p. I 19). Obviously, the experiment had "activated a pathway from visual perception
to speech that simply bypassed the function of Wernicke's area" (p. 1 19), a dynamic
compatible with parallel cognitive processing but contraindicative of classical
sequential models.
The early models' lack of plasticity has also been shown to be erroneous. Whereas
serial and reflexive processing is primarily bottom-up, later cognitive investigation
has shown that even a simple cognitive act (simple in üat it is functionally localized)
generally involves both top-down and bottom-up processing (Posner and Raichle
1994:99), negating the probability that any such task be merely serial and reflexive.
Further, the observed two-way interaction (or resonance) is inextricably tied to
attentional systems that direct top-down processing through many of the identical
neural clusters and connections activated by bottom-up sensory input (pp. 243-244).
Moreover, brain studies have observed such interactions whether the task be visual
or auditory, or the level lexical or semantic; and such studies have clearly suggested
a brain architecture consisting of specialized discrete units connected in a massively
connected hierarchy that practices chunking for processing economy. As described
by Posner and Raichle (1994),
elementary operations are localized in discrete neural areas... cognitive tasks are performed
by networks of widely distributed neural systems... under hierarchical control... [in which]
practice in the performance of any task will decrease the number of neural networks necessary
to perform it... [and] the mind becomes capable of performing behavior through the
development of specific pathways connecting local computations. (Pp. 241-244)
One such neurological architecture from which metaphor "can easily emerge" is
that suggested by Damasio and Damasio (1993), who believe that the brain, rather
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than recording pennanent "pictorial" representations of people or objects as was
once thought, encodes "patterns of synaptic connections that can re-create the separate
sets of activity that define an object or event; [which] record can also stimulate
related ones" (p.58). Thus the visual system will register elements such as color,
shape, contents, and position; the auditory system, pitch, tone, and volume; the motor
cortex, motor movements required to respond to the object, event or person; and the
sensory cortex, tactile sensations such as temperature and texture, or emotional
experience such as pleasure, pain, or fear. According to this interpretation, then,
internal representations of external reality include not only snapshots of the outer
world but also the human experience of exploring, interacting with, and reacting to
this world (p.58).Such interaction occurs so rapidly through a "sequence of
microperceptions and microactions" as to seem simultaneous to the human
consciousness (p.58). Thus, although the model may seem to admit of sequential
thought, these temporal sequences 
-potentially occurring simultaneously in multiple
brain areas- are so rapid as to negate any concept of real time conversions/
transformations of metaphor through analogy.
Corollaries to this interpretation are that specific elements such as color or shape
are encoded in "subdivisions" of functionally specialized regions, the brain
necessarily categorizes such elements to enable simultaneous reactivation, and
records must exist in "convergence" brain argas, in which "axons of feedforward
projecting neurons from one part of the brain converge and join with reciprocally
diverging feedback projections from other regions" (p.58). (Interestingly, the notion
of a convergence center for sensory input has itselfbeen criticized as being Cartesian,
however "all current proposals involve 'binding,' 'convergence zones,' or 'working
memories' for the integration of conscious input," and a possible zorrc for integration
of visual information has been tentatively identified in the inferotemporal cortex
and superior temporal sulcus of the macaque [Baars 1997: n.p.].) In order to
simultaneously "reconstruct previous patterns of mental activity," excitation of the
feedback projections in the convergence area generates simultansous firing of "many
anatomically separate and widely distributed neuron ensembles" (p.58).As Damasio
and Damasio themselves have pointed out, such neural representations greatly
resemble üe cognitive semantic schema suggested by Lakoff.
An obvious major implication of these complex intermodular architectures is
that conceptual mapping of metaphoric elements involves far more than linguistic
elements alone. Indeed, recent neurological findings call into question whether
'language' as a separate entity is even possible. In the hierarchical Petersen et al.
experiment (1989), the basic mental activity of accessing meaning could be measured
by subtracting all previous activity patterns 
-basic perception of cross hairs, visual
or aural word perception, and spoken reproduction ofthe perceived word- from the
highest level task that required meaning interpretation followed by verbal expression,
a conscious manipulation of the concepts that words represent. As outlined above,
this task generated activation in a network of brain areas immediately distinguishable
by not being locally confined like the visual, auditory, and motor systems. Instead,
activated areas were "widely distributed from the front of the brain to the back of
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the temporal lobe on the left side to the far reaches of the right cerebellar hemisphere"
(Posner and Raichle 1994:120). These findings suggest not only that language is
not autonomous, but that thc modularity of the linguistic input has more influence
over geographical activation than does its linguistic level. In other words, the brain
itself appears to analyze language according to modality of presentation nol position
in the linguistic hierarchy.
This non-linguistic emphasis is echoed in an insightful anthropological
interpretation ofcurrent neurological data offered by Deacon (1997), who proposed
that language and the brain coevolved as emerging symbolic manipulation 
-a
response to ever more complex social demands and constraints- reorganized and
developed existing brain areas originally designed only for survival in the physical
world. Deacon draws on a wcalth of neurobiological evidence that suggests that
language processing occurs in a hierarchical fashion throughout tiers that fan outward
into "all major lobes of the neocortex... of the left hemisphere" (pp.290-291). To
support an evolutionary model of the development of language skills, he pointed
out that sensorimotor processing tasks cluster around the Sylvian fissure "adjacent
to primary tactile, auditory, and motor areas;" whereas "higher-level linguistic and
cognitive functions" are "distributed within multimodal and association areas" in
the outer regions (p.291).
Deacon also suggested that this relegation of different aspects to different areas
-besides being obviously affected by modality- implies that mapping of language
onto the brain is an issue of time constraints rather than function; that is, its processing
geography is determined by the time needed to process particular elements rather
than the purpose they serve in the language. From this viewpoint, it is not surprising
that the issue of processing time has raised puzzling questions in several investigations
based on traditional linguistic assumptions. As Rohrer (1995) pointed out,
metaphorical processing is assumed to take place in real time, suggesting that
comprehension of metaphor should require more time than that of literal utterance;
in fact, research suggests that, given sufficient context, this assumption does not
hold true. Even any suggested potential for processing time reduction through
chunking of metaphorical contexts into semantic units has been "contraindicated by
the differing results in [studies ofl long v. shof context conditions" (n.p.). This
variable of processing time has been further confounded by other research suggesting
less processing time needed for highly familiar metaphors than for novel metaphors
(n.p.). Such findings are indeed confusing if addressed within a classical serial
framework; however, if there is indeed no true dichotomy between literal and
Iigurative, if familiar metaphors are stored as prototypes, and if processing is governed
by interconnectivity between distributed systems, such results do not seem quite so
perplexing. The existence of distinct neural systems to subserve distinct language
representations has been strongly supported by West, O'Rourke, and Holcomb ( 1 999)
using event-related brain potentials (ERPs), negative and positive waveforms
rcsulting from voltage fluctuations during electroencephalograms. They proposed
that "concreteness and imageability, while highly correlated, are independent
dimensions by which words and lhcir meanings are organized... Iandl controlled by
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different brain areas," and that "verbal and nonverbal semantic systems are
functionally and anatomically distinct" meaning that "meanings for words can be
redundantly stored in modality specific representations" (n.p.). Such storage would
also explain the coassociation between verbal expression and related affect remarked
upon by Lakoff and Johnson (see above).
Deacon (1997) also suggested that syntactic and morphological markers may
serve primarily to assign language elements to appropriate processing areas. They
therefore serve an "indexical function" for tagging and distributing other language
chunks; indexical functions, it should be noted, that also exist throughout the entire
symbolic reference system, including between icons and the objects they represent
(pp. 300-301). A possible corollary to this assumption is that complex syntactic
structures, rather than being complex computations, may be "ways to distribute
language processes more efficiently across many parallel and partially independent
systems" (p.293).In all, Deacon suggested, "automated language functions are not
grammar modules, but merely symptoms of the grammar, which is itself probably
highly distributed" (p. 299). More important for understanding of metaphor, not
only does he propose that symbolic reference is "virtual" and therefore "only virtually
localized," he claims that "symbolic functions... arise as a collective result of
processes distributed widely within the brain, as well as within the wider social
community itself' (femphasis added] p. 309). Such a theoretical framework, it should
be noted, not only provides a matrix in which the automatic associations between a
metaphorical vehicle and its imagic and sensory correlates are far more likely to
converge geographically than in a traditional "language module" architecture, but
further underscores üe social and conceptual functions of metaphor. Indeed, Deacon
concluded that language appears to be far more neurologically wired into the totality
of human experience than earlier assumed. Such an interpretation is congruent with
both the embodiment hypothesis and the observations of Lakoff and Johnson and
their colleagues of widespread similarities between metaphors that reflect the
universality of human experience. Moreover, the findings emerging from cognitive
neuroscientific inquiry imply at least three major precepts; namely, 1) mind and
reason are inextricable from brain physiology,2) thought is largely unconscious,
and 3) abstract concepts are primarily metaphorical. It is obvious that such a viewpoint
necessarily extends the role of metaphor far beyond that of a mere poetic or rhetorical
embellishment; indeed, it transforms it into the very keystone of the cognitive
inference that allows humans to understand their world.
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